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Immigration and national identity
When it comes to scholarly debates about immigration among political 
theorists and philosophers, it is fair to say that the dominant position is the 
one long defended by Joseph Carens (1987; 2013): that a policy of open 
borders is the only morally acceptable position for someone committed to 
liberal democratic values. Carens adopts an ethical approach, asking what is 
owed to individuals. By contrast, in his new book Strangers in Our Midst: The 
Political Philosophy of Migration, David Miller adopts what he calls a ‘political 
approach’, which aims to take seriously the perspective of political 
communities: the collective values ‘having to do with the general shape and 
character of the society that immigrants may be seeking to enter – for 
example, the overall size of its population, its age profile, the language or 
languages spoken by its inhabitants, or its inherited national culture’ (13). 
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Members of a political community have an interest in political self-
determination, an interest in controlling the future of their society. In this 
review essay, I analyse the conception of political community underlying 
Miller’s self-determination argument for immigration control. 
Writing about the good of political membership decades ago, Michael 
Walzer suggested that it is ‘conceivably the most important good’ because it 
has historically determined access to other fundamental goods. A unique 
feature of the good of membership is that it can only be distributed by taking
people in: ‘they must be physically admitted and politically received’. For 
Walzer, it is obvious who should decide how to distribute membership: ‘we 
who are already members do the choosing’ (Walzer 1983, 29, 32). Who is the
‘we’ that makes up the membership? Walzer analogises the political 
community to a ‘national family’ and suggests that the grounds for state 
control over immigration is the preservation of culturally distinctive 
communities, which are the agents of self-determination exercising power 
over admission and exclusion
Miller has developed a nationalist account of political community more 
fully and applied it to questions of global justice, territorial rights, and 
immigration. On his account, state discretion over immigration derives from 
the collective right of a nation to control its territory and its collective way of 
life. He defines the nation as containing five elements: it is ‘a community (1) 
constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in 
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history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5)
marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture’ (Miller 
1995, 27). It is the fifth element that makes Miller’s account a nationalist 
one. 
A nationalist account of political community runs through Strangers in 
Our Midst. Miller begins with the idea of associative obligations and argues 
that the relationship among compatriots has intrinsic value and gives rise to 
special duties. He characterises the nature of the relationship among 
compatriots as ‘multidimensional’. First, members of a political community 
are involved in a scheme of economic cooperation, which they contribute to 
and benefit from. Second, members are participants in a political and legal 
system that requires them to obey the laws, but also gives them rights of 
participation by which they can exercise collective control over the system. 
Third, members are ‘fellow nationals, people who share a broadly similar set 
of cultural values and a sense of belonging to a particular place. They think 
of themselves as a distinct community of people with historical roots that 
exists as one such community among others’ (26). Miller favours the third 
conception of political community, which, unlike the other two, can explain 
why citizens of a political community would resist the dismemberment of 
their state through secession. If the political relationship were simply about 
economic cooperation or citizenship, ‘there is no obvious reason to resist the 
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breakup’ (28). He also suggests that the first two accounts are insufficient to 
constitute a properly functioning state (29).
Miller argues for state control over immigration in terms of national 
self-determination. The national self-determination account gives rise to 
distinct reasons for state control over immigration that have to do with its 
effects on trust within the nation. Immigration tends to increase ethnic and 
religious diversity in a host society. Research by social scientists suggests 
that increasing diversity may reduce interpersonal trust and trust in political 
institutions, which in turn may make it harder to gain support for policies 
involving economic redistribution and harder for democratic institutions to 
operate in a deliberative manner. Miller invokes such research to emphasise 
that his political approach, in contrast to an ethical approach, ‘gives greater 
weight to the evidence about immigration, trust, and support for welfare’ 
(18). States should regulate immigration with an eye toward its effects on 
the national culture and trust within the nation (64-5).
I want to raise some questions about the nationalist account of political
community. In Strangers in Our Midst, Miller seems to maintain that the 
modern state is best conceived as a nation-state with members sharing a 
national identity, an argument that he developed in his 1995 book On 
Nationality. I share the familiar worries voiced by critics of nationalism. Miller
acknowledges the dark side of the history of nationalism, but he responds 
that national identity need not entail assertions of national superiority and 
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inferiority. Moreover, national identity provides an essential ‘kind of solidarity
that is lacking if one looks just at economic and political relationships’ (27). I 
wonder about the empirical evidence for the latter claim. As Will Kymlicka 
and Keith Banting (2006) have argued, the existence of cultural diversity and
multiculturalism policies in support of cultural diversity do not necessarily 
undermine solidarity and support for redistribution in liberal democratic 
societies. We do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that a thinner 
account of political membership – for example, one based on a shared 
commitment to political values and political institutions – is not enough to 
constitute a properly functioning state.
When it comes to immigration, my worry about a national identity-
based account of self-determination is that it could lead to exclusions that 
are in tension with liberal democratic principles. On Miller’s theory, it would 
be a legitimate policy objective for nation-states to preserve and strengthen 
the national identity of existing citizens (29). Later in the book, he argues 
that states have broad discretion to set their own immigrant admissions 
priorities when it comes to ‘economic migrants’, but justice places 
constraints on how states can exercise this discretion. States cannot exclude
on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion in selecting immigrants. This 
means that immigration policies such as the White Australia policy or the US 
National Origins Quota System would be ruled out. So too would Donald 
Trump’s proposal to ban Muslims from being admitted to the US. There are 
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different reasons for opposing such exclusions. Some argue there is a human
right against discrimination; others argue that selecting by race, ethnicity, or
religion would be an injustice to existing citizens who share the excluded 
group identities. By contrast, Miller argues that racial, ethnic, or religious 
exclusions show disrespect for the would-be migrants because the state fails 
to give ‘relevant reasons’ for refusing entry. Drawing on Michael Blake, he 
argues the relevant condition is that the reasons the state gives for its 
selective admissions policy must be good reasons, reasons that the 
immigrants ought to accept given that the general aims of the policy are 
legitimate ones’ (105). Miller concludes, ‘selection by race or national 
background is unjustifiable, since these attributes cannot be linked (except 
by wholly spurious reasoning) to any goals that a democratic state might 
legitimately wish to pursue’ (106).
But what about a policy of prioritizing members of particular national, 
ethnic, or religious groups because those particular group identities 
constitute a core part of the national identity? Consider Israel’s Law of 
Return, Germany’s Aussiedler policy, or Quebec’s preference for French 
speakers. If the state’s discretion over immigration is based on national self-
determination, it is a legitimate prerogative of the nation-state to favour 
particular ethnic and religious identities that constitute a core part of the 
national identity. The state can say such ethnic or religious favouritism has 
good reasons behind it: the maintenance of a cherished national identity that
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has a particular ethnic and religious identity at its core. Are these ways of 
prioritising migrants on the basis of shared ethnicity or religion permissible 
on Miller’s theory? If so, how are they different from the racial, ethnic, and 
religious exclusion that he explicitly rejects?
The difficulty stems in part from the blurriness of the boundary 
between the concepts of national culture, on the one hand, and ethnicity and
religion, on the other (Song 2008). What does Miller mean by ‘culture’ when 
he discusses ‘cultural selection’ and ‘cultural integration’ among host 
countries? In discussing how immigrants may disrupt existing cultural 
patterns, he refers to ‘new cuisines, new forms of dress, new languages, new
religious practices, new ways of using public space’ (18). Can nation-states 
legitimately exclude ‘immigrants who speak a different language, practice a 
different religion, or have a different lifestyle from the majority’ (107) on the 
grounds that they would alter the existing national identity too much? I do 
not see how a national identity-based account of self-determination can 
resist such exclusions in countries whose national cultures have historically 
been defined in terms of ethnic and religious identities. For some, this is not 
a bug, but an attractive feature of a nationalist account of self-
determination. What are states for, if not the preservation of distinctive 
cultures and ways of life?
It is interesting to note that Walzer does not attempt to draw a line 
between cultural selection and racial selection in his discussion of 
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membership and immigration in Spheres of Justice. He says Australians in 
the early twentieth century had one of two choices in the face of non-white 
refugees seeking admission: Australians could discharge the duty of mutual 
aid to ‘necessitous men and women, clamoring for entry’ either by admitting 
them or by yielding some of their land for the needy strangers to establish a 
separate community, thereby preserving a ‘white Australia’ (Walzer 1983, 
46-7). While he gives weight to the refugees’ claim to enter, he takes just as 
seriously Australians’ claim to keep Australia white. It is not surprising that 
an account of self-determination based on the preservation of a distinctive 
cultural/national identity would include claims for prioritising specific racial 
identities in light of the historical salience of race to shared understandings 
of national identity. Insofar as particular racial and ethnic identities are 
salient parts of the existing national identity, a defence of state control over 
immigration based on the value of national identity seems to permit racial 
and ethnic exclusions.
As I understand Miller’s theory of nationality, however, national culture
and national identity are capacious and contested: they consist not only of 
languages, religions, modes of dress, and distinctive cultural practices and 
identities, but also political values and principles. The challenge, then, for a 
national self-determination account of immigration control is to determine 
what ought to be done when a nation’s commitment to preserving particular 
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ethnic or religious identities conflicts with its commitment to principles of 
equality.
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